September 22, 14:30 - 15:00 with Dr. Daniel Kästner, AbsInt Applied Computer Science
Secure interference analysis for software components
Common to all safety standards is the requirement to determine the data and control flow in the source program and to ensure that it corresponds to the data and control flow specified at the architectural level. The dependencies between software components resulting from the data and control flow are referred to as data and control coupling.
Traditional static analysis cannot guarantee that all possible values of data and function pointers are taken into account. The calculated data and control flow could be incomplete, so that critical interactions of software components could be overlooked. The method of formal static analysis based on abstract interpretation addresses this gap: It can ensure that no data and control corruption occurs due to runtime errors, and that all possible data and function pointers are considered in the analysis, thus the computed data and control flow is complete.
In this presentation, a methodology is presented that makes it possible to reliably determine the data and control coupling between software components and to prove the freedom of interaction of software components. The calculated data and control coupling can also be used to determine previously untested scenarios in the integration test and to check the compliance of the component interactions with the specified software architecture.